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Dallas.  Prepared  for  Kewin  Dowd and  Mervyn  Lewis,  Current  Issues  in  Monetarv
Analysis  and  Policy.  The  views  expressed  in  this  article  are  solely  those  of
the  author  and  should  not  be  attributed  to  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Dal1as
or  to  the  Federal  Reserve  System.  I  rrould  like  to  especially  thank  George
Kaufman  and  Robert  Clair  for  connents  in  earlier  drafts  of  this  paper.If  the  U.S.  econonry  has  performed  so  rernarkably  for  sewen years,  its
banking  system has  surely  been an enbarrassment.  How can  an econouy  that  has
grown consistently  for  more  chan seven years  have  a banking  system  in  such
disarray?  In  1988,  the  slxth  year  of  an expanslon,  the  economy generated  3.5
million  new jobs  --  ovef  300,000 each rnonth.l  In  the  same  period,  200
commercial  banks  failed  --  a post  war  record.  Concomitantly,  12 percent  of
the  nation's  savlngs  and  loans  were  Lnsolvent  according  to  generally  accepted
accounting  principles.  The nation,s  thrift  industry  ls  being  all  but
nationallzed  in  the  process.
In  this  paper,  I  offer  a diagnosis  of  what went wrong wlth  the  U.S.
banking  system  and examlne  some proposed  remedies.  Only  by  understanding  the
Plesent  situation  one can  appreciate  why so many banking  reform  proposals  have
recently  been offered.  Many deal  only  with  syrnptoms  and not  causes,
attempting  to  stop  a  financial  hemorrhage r,rith  a policy  Band-Aid.  In  the
first  half  of  the  paper,  I  focus  on proposals  that  identify  and address  the
causes  of  the  banklng  crisis.  Nonetheless,  these  take  for  granted  most
institutional  features  of  the  monetary  and banking  systems.  In  the  second
half,  I  examine  some even more fundarnental  reforms  that  have  been  recently  put
forth.  I  begln  with  an examination  of  the  thrift  crisis  that  curlently  grips
the  Unlted  States,  The crisis  encompasses all  of  the  problems  plaguing
banklng.  It  is  noteworthy  only  because  the  problens  afe  preselt  to  such  a
heightened  degree  axnong  savings  and loan  associations.
The Thrift  Cris is
It  is  difficult  to  exaggerate  the  magnitude  of  rhe  problens  in  the  U.S.
thrlft  industry.  President  Bush proposed  and  Congress  irnplernented a  $157
billion  bailout  of  insolwent  thrifts,  prevlous  efforts  hawing  conspicuouslyL
failed.  Uost  recent  anong these  was the  late  but  not  lamented  ,,southwest
Plan, "  which  enwlsioned  merging  insolwent  savings  and  loan  associations  wltll
solvent  ones  to  form  a  larger  and more viable  institution.  The Federal  Home
Loan Banking  System,  the  supervtsory  agency  overseelng  the  nation,s  savings
and  loans,  lras  so  constrained  by  political  conslderatlons  that  the  plan  was
dooned from  the  beginning,  First  and forenost,  Congress newer  provided  the
Federal  Horne  Loan Banking  System wlth  enough money to  resolve  the  problern.2
The System had  $10.8  blllion  with  which  to  iraplemenr  rhe  Sourhwesr  plan
which  was not  enough even  to  resolve  the  insolvent  savlngs  and  loans  in
Texas.s  Second,  opposltion  prevented  the  Systen  from  merging  institutions
into  viable  interstate  or  even  statevrlde  lnstitutions.  The lack  of
geographical  diversification  had  contrLbuted  greatly  to  the  economic  losses
incurred  by  thrifts.  Localisrn  was to  be  preserved  as  a natter  of  public
policy.
Finally,  when all  else  is  said,  the  Southwest  Plan  was flawed  in  a wery
basic  way:  The plan  had been  trled  once before  and  failed.  The Southwest
Plan  reincarnated  the  nphoenix"  progran  of  the  early  1980s,  which  merged two
or  more failing  thrifts  into  one  larger  entity.  The Federal  Savings  and Loan
Insurance  Corporation  (FSLIC)  injected  new funds  into  the  instituti.ons  and
replaced  nanagement.  The policy  was predicated  on  the  belief  that  one  larger
insolwent  instltution  is  better  than  two  snaller  ones.  Whatever  the
attraction  rnight  have  been  originally,  the  plan  failed  in  its  irnplementat ion.
FSLIC found  it  difflcult  to  extricate  itself  frorn  the  mesa-  ins t i tutions  it  had
created (Kane, 1985, pp.  5-6).
The Southwest  Plan  was supposed to  be  dlfferent  because  it  would  attract
private  capital  and permlt  a rapid  withdrawal  of  FSLIC,s equity  position.  Notnuch  private  capital  was attracted,  however,  and  FSLIC retains  a  substantial
iropllclt  investment  positlon.  The new o!,rrers wefe  largely  irnmunized frorn
losses.  Any posttive  present  walue  these  new phoenlx  flrms  possess  reflects
the  FSLIC guarantee.  A balance  sheet  accurately  reflecting  market  values  of
assets  and  liabtllties  would  enter  the  guarantee  as  an  funplicit  equlty
investnent.  Llkewise,  an accurate  representation  of  the  goverfiIlent's  own
balance  sheet  would  show the  guarantee  as  a uasslwe  taxpayer  liability.
If  not  conpletely  natlonalized,  the  new phoenix  instltutlons  still  have
a  large  FSLTC  lnvolvenent.  If  the  past  is  any  guide,  these  undercapitaliz  ed
institutions  will  hawe a  difficult  tine  surviving.  Some  will  probably  end up
back  in  the  care  of  the  deposit  insurer.  The rnain point  here,  however,  is
that  the  Southwest  Plan  as  implenented  repeated  many of  the  mistakes  of  the
phoenix  program.  once  the  Federal  Home  Loan Bank Board  saw thaL  sufficient
prlvate  capital  nould  not  be  forthcoming,  it  should  have  withdrawn  the  p]-an.
To go ahead in  disregard  of  its  onn previous  policy  failure  makes the  Bank
Board  culpable  no matter  r,rhat the  constralnts  were  under  which  it  was
operating.
President  Bush's  proposal  makes explicit  what has long  been implicic:
the  necessity  for  the  taxpayer  to  undervrrite  the  losses  accruing  frorn
successLve  public  policy  fallures  in  the  thrift  industry.  The proposal  also
signals  the  end of  the  Southwest  Plan.  Finally,  the  proposal  renoves  the
thrift  crisis  frorn  the  status  of  a  reglonal  problern  to  a national  one.  For
these  and  other  reasons,  the  plan  is  laudable.  It  does have  the  potential,
however,  for  mlsdirecting  polic1'rnakers'  attentlon  and,  possibly,  sowing  the
seeds  of  an even  larger  financlal  crisis  in  the  future.4
As  constituted,  the  plan  suggests  thac  money !s  the  gg!34[4  to  the
thrlft  crisis.  Certalnly,  an  injection  of  funds  nust  be  an  eleDent  in  any
plan.  But  lack  of  rnoney, specifically  capital,  is  not  the  primary  cause  of
the  current  crlsis.  The savings  and loan  industry  dlsslpated  billions  of
dollars  of  capital  that  it  onee had.  Understanding  how indtwldual
instltuttons  could  not  only  perrnit  thetr  capital  to  dissipate,  but  also  rnove
deeply  into  the  red  ls  fundanental  to  any pernanent  solution.  Ttlat
understanding  has  yet  to  take  hold  anong policymakers.  It  requlres  insight
into  how federal  deposit  insurance  operates.
Before  discussing  the  role  of  deposit  insurance,  I  offer  a perspective
to  non-American  readers.  Focusing  on deposit  insurance  may strike  you  as
parochial,  But  deposit  insurance  is  only  the  peculiarly  American  forrn  that
blanket  financial  quarantees  of  the  banking  systen  have  taken.  Any policy
that  effectively  undenrfites  banking  losses  produces  moral  hazard  and  invites
Amefican  style  banklng  problems.  As  Europeans  look  to  1992,  they  need  to
consider  the  incentives  generated  by  thelr  public  policy  toward  banking.
Among other  things,  they  need
public  policy  towards  banking
not  imitated.
DeDosit  Insurance
learn  to  allow  insolvent  banks to  fail.  U.S.
one American  idea  that  should  be  discarded. IS
In  the  simplest  terms,  insurance  constltutes  an  lntertemporal  exchange
between  the  insured  and  the  insuref.  Ttle insured  trades  a  flxed  loss  or  ourqo
each period  (the  premium)  for  a promise  that  he will  be  indernnifled  against
Iosses  of  a  stated  kind,  but  an uncertain  amount,  for  the  life  of  the
insurance  contract,  The  insured  gains  because he  forgoes  a  srnall  sum in
return  for  protection  against  a potentially  greater  loss.  The insurer  gains5
because, by  poollng  risks  of  nany insures,
basic  principle  is  qulte  sirnple,  prowision
can  earn  a  Profit.  Though  the
insurance  is  a  cornplex  natter.
Many of  the  provlsions  of  an insurance  contract  are  designed  to  specify  the
exact  rlsks  covered  and the  amounts of  the  coverage.  other  provisions  are
designed  to  constraln  the  insured's  behavior  in  the  future,  because  possession
of  insurance  establlshes  perverse  incentives,  Havlng  insurance  reduces  the
lncentives  for  the  insured  to  avoid  the  rlsk  against  which  he  has  been
insured.  Such behawlotal  change,  by  increasing  the  frequency  of  occurrence  of
the  risk,  would  alter  the  probability  calculus  underlying  the  insurance
contract:  What would  have  been  a profitable  transactLon  for  the  insurance
company might  becorne  unprofitable  (Arrow,  L97I,  p.  L42).
Fire  insrfance  provides  a  readily  understandable  example.  A homeowner
cowered by  flre  insuxance  will,  on  the  margln,  Eake fewer  precautions  than  he
r,Tould  were  he  exposed to  the  entire  rlsk  of  loss  due  to  fire.  Notice  that  1
am not  assuming  that  he will  deliberately  lncrease  the  risk  of  fire.  (Such
behavior  might  occur  if  the  house were  insured  for  more than  its  value.)  Risk
is  sornething  that  individuals  x0ust incur  costs  to  avoid.  Being  insured
against  a particular  risk  reduces  the  return  to  rlsk  awoldance.  Insured
individuals  will,  therefore,  reduce  their  effort  at  the  margin  to  avold  the
rlsk,  Consequently,  fisky  outcomes increase.
A  situatlon  in  which  opportunlstlc  behavlor  wlll  result  in  greater
risk  is  called  moral  hazard,  Sound insurance  is  structured  to  awoid  moral
tr'azaxd, or  offset  its  effects  with  countervailing  incentives.  In  the  case  of
flre  insurance,  underwriters  r"rill  both  prescribe  and proscribe  certain
behavior  so  as  to  reduce  the  probability  of  loss.  The insurance  contract  will
norrnally  lnclude  a  deductible  anount,  so  the  insured  bears  sorne of  the  cost  of
he
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opportunistic  behavior.  The presenee  of  such  features  ls  essential  to  the
vlability  of  insurance  as  a  commercial  product.
Since  1-933, the  U.S.  government  has  provided  for  lnsurance  of  bank
deposits.e  Initlally  set  at  $2,500 per  deposit,  the  insured  amount has risen
over  the  years.  In  1980,  Congress  raised  the  coverage  frorn  $40,000  to
$100,000.  Indiwlduals  are  covefed for  up to  $100,000 at  each depository
lnstitution.  Since  there  are  approxlmately  1,4,000 separate  conmerclal  banks
in  the  United  States,  one individual  could  theoretically  hold  $1.4 billion  ln
insured  deposits  at  cornmercial  banks.  Additionally,  there  are  the  nation's
thrift  lnstitutions,  savings  and  loans,  plus  credit  unions.  Furthernore,  by
holding  Jolnt  accounts  and accounts  in  trust  for  others,  an  lndlwidual  can
multiply  several  fold  the  tnsured  deposits  in  each bank.5
Federal  deposit  insurance  has  always  been provided  in  an unsound
fashion.  Speclfically,  the  premir.rms  charged  are  unrelated  to  the  riskiness  of
the  bank's  portfol-lo.  Thus provided,  deposlt  lnsurance  skews the  choice  in
favor  of  lncurring  additional  losses.  An investor  can  generally  l-ncrease  the
probability  of  earning  higher  returns  if  he  is  wilting  to  incur  additional-
risk  of  loss  (Short  and 0'Driscolf,  1983, pp.  14-1-5),  A rarional  investor
weighs  uhe expected  returns  agalnst  the  risk  of  loss,  and decldes  whether  an
investment's  expected  returns  conpensates  for  the  probability  of  loss.
Normally,  various  rnarket  signals  are  sent  to  an  investor  undertaking  a
risky  actlvity.  If  he  has  purchased  lnsurance  protection  for  the  activity,  he
will  face  rising  premiurns as  the  risk  increases.  The higher  prerniurns will
tend  to  restrain  risk  taking  by  increasing  its  cost.  In  the  case  of  banking,
this  channel  is  blocked.  It  turns  out,  however,  that  blocking  this  channel
also  interferes  with  the  transnisslon  of  other  potential  rnarket  signals.I
Crediuors  of  rny hypotheticaL  lnvestor  wlll  ordinarily  make the  same
risk-return  declsion  as  the  investor.  As  the  tl.sk  of  hls  investment
increases,  creditors  will  demand  higher  returns.  Accordlngly,  the  investor
will  pay  higher  interest  rates  on borrowings  the  riskler  is  the  proposed
investment  project.  We observe  the  phenonenon in  a wide  variety  of  contexts.
Well  established  firrns  in  predictable  lines  of  business  pay  less  to  borrow
than  staru-up  flturs  in  netr and untested  business  ventures.  B-rated  bond
issues  pay a higher  return  than A-rated  issues.
We hawe not  historically  observed  the  relationship  in  banking  --
certainly  not  to  the  sarne degree.  While  riskier  banks  hawe had  a higher  cost
of  funds,  the  differentlal  has  tended  to  emerge not  when the  risk  was taken,
but  only  after  problerns  developed.  To be  an effective  price  signal,
any premium must  affect  risk  taklng  ex  ante.  Moreovef,  the  roagnitude  of  the
differentials  ln  banks's  funding  costs  have  historically  not  approached  those
for  nonfinancial  corporations  (Short,  1987).
Because of  misprlced  deposit  insurance,  the  deposit  market  does not
adequately  constrain  risk  taking  by  banks.  The narket  for  deposits  is  the
most  inportant  one  for  pricing  rlsk  in  banking  because banks  enter  it  daily.
By contrast,  banks  issue  new equity  shares  or  subordinated  debt  infrequently.
In  the  United  States,  nost  banks  are  small  and will  never  issue  either  debt  or
new equlty  once  establlshed.  If  the  deposit  narket  does not  work,  then  banks
will-  not  teceive  timely  narket  signals  as  they  alter  their  risk  exposure.
Consequently,  they  w111 tend  to  incur  too  much risk  (giwen  the  expected
return).
Depositors  are  not  irrational.  The sarne indiwiduals  who tgnore  a  bank's
tisk  of  fallure  carefully  investigate  the  risk  of  their  nonbank  investnents.6fl
The incentives  generated  by  deposit  insurance  explaln  the  apparently
inconsistent  behavlor.  DeDositors  behave  as  if  thev  are  not  at  risk  because
thev  normall]r  are  not.  Deposits  at  insured  banks  have  no  rlsk  of  loss  so  long
as  their  account  balances  are  within  the  insured  linits.  At  large  banks,
daposlts  of  any size  can be held  risk  free.  This  ls  because of  the  ',too big
to  fail"  doctrlne  that  protects  large  banks  from  failure,  In  an ornlnous
development,  regulators  have  in  one  lnstance  --  Continental  lllinois  National
Bank --  indernnified  all  creditors,  depository  and nondepos  itory,  of  a  failed
bank.7  Blanket  guarantees  of  safety  anesthetize  credit  markecs,  dulling  the
senses to  risk.
Many factors  can  generate  losses  on bank  portfolios,  The relevant
Policy  question,  howewer,  is  why so many bank  managers have  permitted  losses
to  nount,  erodlng  capital  and threatening  their  viability  of  their
institution.  And,  if  managers have  allowed  this  to  happen,  why have
depositors  funded  the  losses?  In  other  words,  what  is  the  SJSlCgtg  cause  of
the  current  banking  problerns  in  the  United  States?  llisprlced  deposit
insurance  has  played  a  criuical  role  in  the  emergence of  these  problems.
Insolwent  banks  ate  currently  open for  business  and attracting  deposits,
And attract  funds  they  must,  because  they  are  using  insured  deposits  to  cover
dal1y  operating  losses.  Institutions  known to  be  insolvent  can  attract  funds
only  because  deposit  insurance  imrnunizes the  depositor  from  loss.  The
deposltor  is  effectlvely  depositing  his  uroney  with  the  governnent,  not  the
bank -
Not  only  do  insolvent  lnstitutions  garner  funds  in  conpetitive  deposit
markets,  thelr  stock  trades  at  a  positive  price.  This  makes no  sense  in
ordinary  accounting  terms,  unless  one realizes  that  the  stock  trades  with  aY
put  option  on  the  deposit  insurance  fund.  For  a  firm  to  be  lnsolwent  means
that  its  llabilities  exceed its  assets,  Accordingly,  its  equity  value  ought
to  be negative.  A positlve  share  price,  however,  irnplies  posltive  equity
value.  What gives?  What gives,  or  who gives,  is  the  taxpayer.  The equlty
rnarkets  clarify  lrhat  accounting  practices  obfuscate  --  deposlt  lnsurance
guarantees  ate  an unbooked asset  on  the  balance  sheets  of  deposltory
instltutions.  Indeed,  Kane (1985, p,  23) has estlmated  rhar  rhe U.S.
government  is  'rthe  leading  supplier  of  equity  funds  to  deposlt  lnstitutions.  "
Put  ln  the  most  straightforward  way,  deposit  insurance  constltutes  a
blanket  guarantee  against  losses  to  depositors.  By protecting  deposltors,
however,  deposlt  insurance  also  Lnsulates  stockholders  and managers agains!
near-tern  effects  of  excessiwe  fisk  taking.  Managers are  free  to  engage in
strategies  that  'rbet  the  bank"  on particular  outcomes.  If  they  wln,  managers
book  the  profits.  If  they  lose,  the  deposit  insurance  picks  up  the  tab  for
any losses  in  excess of  bank capital
Critics  point  to  the  lo!,  level  of  capital,  particularly  equity  capital,
in  U.S.  depository  institutions.  Sone see  this  as  the  cause  of  current
difficulties.  Consequently,  many have  called  for  tougher  capital  standards.
There  ls  no  questlon  that  bank  capltal  has  eroded  ln  recent  years  and  that  a
healthy  dose  of  capital  tould  screngthen  depository  institutlons.  But  actions
to  lrnprove  the  capital  positions  of  banks  will  not  address  the  fundamental
problern  of  lncentives.  With  deposit  insurance,  who needs  capital?  It  is  a
wonder  that  banks  have  any at  all.  Mlsprlced  deposit  Lnsurance
encourages  the  substitution  of  public  for  private  capital.
Uncovered  creditors  (for  example,  holders  of  subordinated  debt)  will
inslst  that  the  bank  have  sorne  equity  capital  .  In  recent  years,  the  demandsl-0
hawe becorne  more  lnsistent  as  these  cfedltors  have watched  the  rising  bank
failure  rate.  Most  banks  do not  issue  any  subordinated  debt,  honever.  To a
significant  extent,  banks  are  holding  as  much capital  as  they  do  only  because
of  regulatory  pfessure.  Where that  pressure  has  been  relaxed  and  supervision
lax  --  as  ln  the  savings  and  loan  lndustry  --  capital  levels  are  lower  than  in
the  rest  of  the  banking  systen.
If  lncentives  are  not  changed,  coupelllng  banks  to  hold  nore  capital  nay
Just  be  increasing  the  anount  to  be  dissipated  by  risk  taklng.  True,  nore
capital  lengthens  the  period  in  which  regulators  can  identify  problero
institutions.  But  the  ragulatory  record  does not  nake  one sanguine  that
regulators  will  avail  thenselves  of  the  opportunity,  Seweral  factors
contrlbute  to  the  problem.
Fifst  and  foremost,  the  incentive  structure  rlilitates  against  the
abllity  of  regulators  to  sufficiently  constrain  bankers'  behawlor.  Bankers
stand  to  capture  the  gains  from  financial  innovations.  For  every  form  of  risk
taking  constrained,  bankers  have  found  two  new ways to  take  on roore risk  in
the  search  for  higher  returns.  The lure  of  higher  profits  w111 always  make it
feasible  for  banks  to  pay  inventive  employees more than  regulatory  ageneies
can  compensate methodical  examlners.  If  an  exarniner happens  along  who
outmaneuvers  the  best  and brightest  products  of  the  nation's  business  schools,
a  depository  instltution  will  likely  lure  hirn away.
Second,  regulators  Judge bank  solvency  according  to  accounting
principles  that  value  assets  at  cost  or  book walue,  The economic  solvency  of
a bank  depends on market  values,  however.  The discrepancy  between hlstorical
or  accounting  walue,  and economic or  r0arket  walue,  can be  quite  large.  It  is
certainly  large  enough to  permit  a bank  to  stay  withln  regulatory  standards,t1
but  be  utterly  insolvent  if  lts  assets  and liablllttes  were  marked  to  market,
If  taxpayers  are  to  be  protected  against  future  losses,  a market-valued
accounting  system  uust  be  introduced.
Third,  it  is  practically  lnpossible  to  supervlse  adequately  all  the
number of  depository  instl-tutions  in  the  United  States.  Conmercial  banks
alone  nuqber  approxinately  14,000.  The ktnd  of  close  supervl-slon  necessary  to
prevent  loss  to  the  insurance  fund  is  beyond  the  resources  concelwably
available  to  the  superwisory  agencies.
Finally,  supervisory  respons lb il- ities  are  diwided  be  reen  federal  and
state  goverrments.  (This  dlvision  is  raThat  is  neant  by  "dual  banking"  in  the
Unlted  States.  )  It  would  be  naive  to  expect  the  federal  and  state
bureauctacies  to  keep  at  all  times  in  as  close  contact  as rpould be  necessary
to  adequately  supervlse  banks.  Additionally,  the  interests  of  federal  and
state  banking  regulators  do not  always  coincide.  State  regulators  generally
take  a Posltlon  as  nore  of  an advocate  for  the  interests  of  the  banks  they
supervise  than  do  their  federal  counterparts.  More inportantly,  the  deposit
insurance  agencies  are  more attentive  to  the  effects  of  public  policy  on  their
funds  than  are  the  other  regulators,  be  they  state  or  federal.
All  thlngs  considered,  lt  is  too  rnuch to  expect  any  system  of
supervision  and  regulatlon  to  offset  perverse  incentives  established  by
financial  safety  nets  like  the  present  deposit  insurance  systen.  To
stralghten  out  the  mess,  policy  makers need  uo get  the  incentives  right.
Gettln8  incentLves  right,  however,  seems  to  be just  what  the  polltical  systen
seerns  least  capable of  doing.  If  the  pessimistic  assessrnent  is  accurate,  then
the  present  crisis  has  the  potential  to  be  repeated  --  probably  within  the
next  decade.  And each repetlcion  brings  greater  federal  goverrunentinvolveuent  and  further  moves to  de facto  nationalization  of  banking  in  the
United States  (Kane, 1985, p.  13).
other  factors  have  contributed  significantly  to  the  current  Lhrift
crisis.  Previous  regulation  of  savings  and  loans  can  only  be  described  as  lax
--  at  both  the  state  and  federal  levels  (Kane 1989).  When sawings  and  loans
experienced  losses,  the  Federal  Hone Loan Bank Board  engaged in  "capital
forbearance.'r  The policy  further  relaxed  capital  standards.  To put  lt
straight  forwardly,  regulators  allowed  the  industry's  actual  capital  posltlon
to  affect  the  capital  regulations,  rather  than  the  other  way around.s  Now the
taxpe.yer  will  be  payi.ng  the  piper.
One nust  be wery  careful  not  to  confuse  cause  and effect.  The existence
of  deposit  Lnsurance  leads  banks  to  lower  capital  below  what  it  ra'ould
otherwtse  be.  Additionally,  rnispriced  deposit  insurance  results  in  excessive
risk  taking  that  often  erodes  what  capltal  there  is.  Increasing  capital
requlrements,  howewer,  is  not  a  substitute  for  altering  the  lncentives  set  up
by  deposit  insurance.
. Deoosit  Insutance  Reforn
Virtually  every  tnaj  or  public  policy  problen  in  banking  derives  fron  the
existence  of  mlspriced  deposit  lnsurance.  If  deposit  insurance  is  not
actually  the  cause  of  the  problem,  it  is  the  chief  obstacle  to  reforrn.  0n1y
recently,  however,  has  the  deposit  insurance  system become the  focus  of
banking  teform  proposals.  That  it  has  done so  is  testimony  to  the  suddenness
with  which  the  consensus  on the  deposit  insurance  systern has  changed.
In  their  monumental work  on banking  history,  Friedrnan.and  Schwartz
(1963, p.  434)  concluded that  "federal  deposit  insurance  of  bank deposlts  was
the  most  inportant  structural  change  in  the  banking  systen  to  result  from  theIJ
1933 panic,  and,  i.ndeed ln  our  view,  the  structural  change most  conducive  to
nonetary  stability  since  state  bank  noEes wefe  taxed  out  of  exlstence
irnmediately  after  the  Civil  War."  In  other  words,  deposit  insurance  was a
goverrunent program  that  worked  --  even  from  a  classical  liberal,s  perspective.
Friednan  and  Schwartz,s  statenent  at  once  summarized economists,  view  at  the
time  and  shaped it  for  years  to  come.
Besides  deregulatlng  deposit  liabilttles  and broadenlng  asset  powets  for
thrifts,  the  Carn-St  Gernain  Act  nandated  that  the  deposit  insurance  agencies
reexanlne  the  Lnsurance  protection  afforded  commercial  banks,  savings  and
loans,  and  credit  unions.  This  produced  a  flurry  of  studies  at  the  various
federal  bank  regulatory  agencies.  The studies,  though  well  done,  languished.
The moral  hazard  inherent  in  the  deposit  insurance  system was evident  to  many,
but  it  was not  the  tlne  to  act  polltically.
It  is  now apparent  to  nearly  al]  that  the  deposic  insurance  system  is
broke  in  nore  ways  than  one  (Garcia  1988).  Through  rhe  end of  1988,  there
have been  878 cornrnercial bank  failures  in  the  1980s  for  an  annual  average  of
98.  In  1989,  207 banks  insured  by  the  Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation
(FDIC)  falled.  Meanwhile,  262 savings  and  loans  have  been  intervened  and are
being  operated  under  FDIC supervision.s  These figures  compare with  an annual
average  of  6 cornmercial  bank  failures  in  the  period  L946-79,  Recorded
failures  undoubtedly  understate  banking  ptoblerns.  If  assets  and  liabilities
were valued  at  market  rather  than  historical  prices,  additional  banks  ruould
surely  be  rewealed  to  be  insolvent.  FSLIC is  broke  and  the  FDIC'S  fund  is
strained.
Suddenly,  substantive  reforrn  of  deposit  insurance  is  a  serious
possibility.  Once again,  the  regulatory  agencies  are  studying  the  question.L4
And the  topic  appears  on aluost  every  banking  progriun,  Yet  all  the  proposals
take  as  given  the  political  lmpossibility  of  conpletely  aboltshlng  federal
deposit  insurance,10  Consequently,  ln  one way or  another,  each proposal
involwes  conDromises.
Benston,  et  al  (1986, pp.  304-14) advocate a falrly  typical  refom
package  for  FDIC lnsurance,  Fifst,  the  authors  recornmend  establishing  risk-
elated  premiums  for  deposit  insurance.  They prefer  joining  this  with  a  systen
of  risk-adjusted  capital  standards.  Next,  they  suggest  several  alternatlves
for  reducing  coverage.  These  include  a  selectLve  rollback  of  the  de jure
coverage from  $100,000 ro  50,000 or  $25,000.  Finally,  they  argue rhau
Ptemlums should  be  coll-ected  based  on  the  riskiness  of  the  entire  portfolio  of
the  hol-ding  company.  Th"y  rejec!  the  idea  that  the  rlsks  of  nonbank
actlvities  can be  functlonally  isolated  from  them.11
ln  an earller  artlcle,  Short  and O'Driscoll  (1983) proposed a plan
designed  to  facilitate  a  transltl"on  to  conpetitive  provLslon  of  deposit
insurance.  They proposed  that  de facto  coverage  above  statutory  llnits  be
eliruinated;  coverage  lirnits  be  introduced,  and  some form  of  coinsurance
developed.  These proposals  were  each  intended  to  address  the  moral  hazard
inherent  ln  the  current  systen,  Additionally,  they  recommended  a number of
other  actions  to  open the  door  to  private  suppliers  of  deposit  insurance.
They did  so  on  the  views  that,  wiLhout  competitlve  markets,  it  would  be
imposstble  to  systenatically  price  the  risk.  The FDIC could  renaLn  as  a
supplier  of  deposit  lnsurance,  but  its  rnonopoly needed  to  be  eliminated.
Flannery  and Protopapadakis  (1985, p.8)  advanced the  critique  of  a
governmental  agency's  attempting  to  prlce  rlsk.l.l
Public  institutions'  decisions  are  subject
to  publlc  scrutiny.  Such scrutiny  can
involve  lengthy  debates,  appeal
pfocedures,  and  conprouises  between
economic efflclency  and political  needs.
Even the  rnost well-neanlng  and efficient
publlc  institutions  move wlth  glaclal
speed compared to  the  rapid  assessment  of
information  and  the  continuous
reassessment  of  risk  that  takes  place  in
the  financial  markets.
Aslde  from  the  public  choice  critique,  there  afe  addltlonal  difficulties
with  reform  proposals  llke  those  offered  by  Benston,  et  al.  Analysis  suggests
that  narket  forces  are  likely  to  effectively  undermine  many of  the  suggested
reforrns  that  are  lnstituEed.  For  lnstance,  there  does not  appear  to  be
coverage  1ow enough to  prevent  most  depositors  from  securing  as  rnuch insurance
prolectj.on  as  they  desire.  Money-market  brokers  routinely  place  funds  in  lots
as  small  as  $L,000.  With  cornmercial  banks  and  thrifts  nurnbering  in  the
thousands,  financial  markets  could  reallocate  even  large  sums into  many
smaller  lnsured  accounts.  Any successful  proposal  surely  must  incorporate
sone  form  of  deductible  or  coinsurance.  Yet  any  such  proposal  would  run  afoul
of  the  political  conrnLtrnent to  protecting  srnaller  depositors.
Deposlt  insurance  was crafted  to  protect  not  the  snall  depositor,  but  a
system of  uneconomically  small  and undiversified  banks (O,Driscoll,  1988b, pp.
2-5).  Economic fact,  however, cannot  surmount the  obstacle  of  the  polltical
nytholo8y  surrounding  the  snall  depositot.  Unless  the  rnythology  is16
successfully  countered,  deposit  insurance  reform  will  be  unsuccessful.  Even
the  $150 billlon  cost  of  the  thrift  crisis  has  not  shaken  the  faith  of  the
systemts  supporters.  Perhaps only  a second bill  of  similar  size  will  awaken
Anerican  taxpayers  to  the  system's  cos!.
Other  banking  reform  proposals  attenpt  to  offset  the  effects  of  deposlt
lnsurance  by  perforrning  more radical  surBery  on the  banking  system.  Robert
Lltan  (1986,  1987 and 1988) has proposed inplementing  a uodlfied  version  of
100 per  cent  banking  --  the  old  "Chicago  Plan"  for  banking.  Hls  plan
envlsions  highly  dlversified  flnanclal  holdlng  companles  (akin  to  universal
banks),  which  would  conprise  both  tradltional  corunercial  banking  services  as
well  as  a broad  range  of  additlonal  financial  services.  His  plan  enwislons
carving  out  a narrow  subset  of  banking  services;  only  these  services  could  be
funded by  insured  deposits.  ",..The  ,bank,...would  essentially  be a noney-
narkel  fund,  peruitted  to  invest  in  highly  liquid  rsafe'  securities,  such as
obllgatlons  of  the  United  States  Treasury  and high-quality  cornmerclal  paper"
(Litan,  1986, p,10).  The financial  holding  company,  s other  activities  could
be  funded  by  anything  except  insured  deposits.
Litan's  ingenious,  if  somewhat  cornplex, plan  testifies  to  the  lengths
reformers  must  go  to  offset  the  effects  of  deposit  insurance.  Viewed  in
isolation,  Lhe plan  makes little  sense.  I{hy  institute  a  legally  separate
lnstitution  for  lnwesting  in  very  safe  and liquid  assets?  Tlte answer,  the
only  answer,  is  the  existence  of  a blanket  guarantee  for  deposits.  To render
that  systern safe  and sound,  the  assets  purchased  rrith  the  deposits  x0ust
themselves  be  immunized from  risk  --  Litan,s  plan  would  largely  accomplish
this  task  at  the  cost  of  potentlal  inefficlencies  in  the  financial  systen.LI
The inefficiencies  rnay  be  preferable,  however,  to  the  losses  being  generated
under  the  current  sys  tem.
One telli-ng  crllicism  of  the  Litan  proposal  can be  made.  The proposal
suggests  that  deposit  lnsurance  only  be  offerbd  on  transaction  accounts  backed
100 per  cent  by  highly  liquid  and safe  assers.  Yer  rhe  financial  system  has
already  developed  a  similar  system:  noney-market  rnutual  funds.  Notabty,
however,  these  accounts  are  not  insured,  In  the  United  States,  they  have
groum phenomenally,  and now contaln  rrrell  over  9300 billion  in  assets.
O'Driscoll  (1988a, pp.  673-14) questioned whether a broad  systern of  lnsurlng
deposlts  of  a  safe  and  sound banking  system would  meet  a market  test.  The
experience  of  money-market  mutual  funds  suggests  that  deposlt  insurance  would
not  be  required  1n such  a  system.  Further,  if  banks  were  coEpelled  to  provtde
such  insurance  on  transaction  accounts,  they  would  likely  lose  even more
market  share  to  noney-market  mutual  funds,  The latter  have  been  consistently
lower  cost  providers  of  funds.  It  appears,  then,  that  Litan,s  proposaL  uright
be  a  case  of  overkill.  If  we could  get  banks  to  hold  the  appropriately  safe
asset  portfolios,  then  deposit  insurance  would  be  unnecessary.12
Market  forces  and  leglslative  changes at  the  state  level  are  evolving  a
systen  of  rnore diverslfied  regional,  if  not  natlonal  banks.  These
developmenus are  to  applauded,  as  they  nay  partlally  offset  the  effects  of
deposit  insurance  (0'Driscoll  1988a).  Broadening bank powers to  permit
greater  asset  diversification  nould  further  strengthen  the  U.S.  banking  system
(Benston,  et  aI.,  1986, pp.  IZ7-59).  It  is  unlikely,  however,  thar  the  U.S.
banking  system will  be  safe  and sound until  deposit  insurance  is  e1lmlnated  or
signif  icantly  changed.18
Sorne  banklng  reform  proposals  now go  significantly  beyond  addressing
deposit  insurance.  These proposals  question  basic  features  of  the  exlsttng
banking  systern.  In  the  next  section,  I  examine  some of  thern and analyze  the
lssues  they  raise.
Banking  Reform
Robert  Lltan's  plan  constltutes  a  transition  betrueen reform  ptoposals
designed  sirnply  to  deal  with  the  moral  hazard  generated  by  the  current  deposlt
insurance  system,  and  those  proposals  envisaging  nore  far-reaching  changes  in
the  commercial  banking  system.  A move to  100 per  cent  banking  would  be  a
signiflcant  change  in  commercial  banking.  In  the  context  of  Litan,s  proposal,
the  move is  probably  not  a rnaj  or  one.  Yet  he  ftopllcltly  raises  the  question
of  whether  substantial  changes  ln  the  structure  of  the  banking  system  are
needed.  l^lhat the  proposals  I  now consider  have  in  conmon is  that  they  each
provide  an  affirmative  answer  to  the  question.
A11 of  the  proposals  examined here  advocate  a highly  deregulated
financial  systen  in  which  there  is  no  role  for  central  banks,  Since  Europeans
are  now debating  ra'hether to  have  a  European central  bank,  the  questions  raised
by  the  ltterature  are  particularly  relevanr  roday.  i{htte  (1984)  is  rhe  nosr
influential  recent  r,/ork on  the  historical  perforrnance  of  free  banking.  He
exanined the  Scottish  case.  In  a series  of  articles,  Rolnick  and Weber (1982,
L983,  L984,  and  1986)  reexamined  the  American  free  banking  experience.13
Idhite  (1984)  argued that,  ludged by  accepted criteria,  the  Scottish
system  of  competltive  and unregulated  free  banking  performed  weII  historically
(1716-1844).14  The banking  system was safe  and relatively  stable.  While
there  were  bank  failures,  these  did  not  generate  uncontai4ed  runs  or  sysEemic
failure.  The Scottlsh  banks  compared particularly  well  to  the  unstableEngllsh  banking  system,  whose source  of  strength  was the  Bank of  England.
I,Ihite  found  the  Scottish  system  to  be  stable  despite  the  absence of  a  central
bank.
In  her  important  but  neglected  book  on central  banking,  Lutz  (1936)
aptly  described  the  American  banking  system  as  one of  ',  decentralization
without  freedou.'r  To  this  day,  the  American  banking  system  reflects  a  public
policy  of  an uneconomically  large  number of  sroal1 banking  unlts.  In  conrrasr,
llhlte  (L984, pp.  33-34 and 82-84)  idenrified  the  system of  nationr,'ide branch
banking  as  playing  a  crucial  role  in  stabilizing  Scorrish  banks  by  imnunizing
them  from  local  do\^mturns.  Additionally,  ln  ttre  U,S.,  regulators  have
traditlonally  prescrlbed  and proscribed  assets  for  bank  portfollos.
Particularly  important  in  nany  states  was the  requlrement  that  lnstltutlons
chartered  under  the  free-banking  staEutes  hold  state  bonds  as  collateral  for
notes  issued.  Purportedly  designed  to  ensure  that  notes  were  backed  by  safe
assets,  the  requirenents  look  rnore like  a  scheme designed  to  stimulate  denand
for  the  sometines  dubious  paper  of  antebellum  state  goverrunents.  In  sone
cases,  new banks  could  acquire  depreciated  state  bonds  and deposit  thern with
the  state  banklng  cornmissioner,  who valued  them at  par.  The banks  then  issued
liabiliuies  ln  the  forn  of  bank  notes  against  the  lnflated  value  of  the  bonds.
This  policy  effectively  made rhe  banks  insolvent  from  their  inception.  In
periods  of  rislng  interest  rates,  the  gap betrreen  accounting  and Darket  values
of  the  bonds  increased.  If  a bank  experienced  a  run,  Lt  would  be unable  to
redeem all  its  notes.  This  made for  a  system  of  unsound banking  and gave  free
banking  its  bad name  anong historians.
Rolnick  and lJeber  thus  dealt  with  a  system  of  free  banklng  more alike  in
name than  akln  in  substance  Inrith the  Scottish  systen.  yet  they  found  that  the20
system was not  lnherently  unstable.  That  is,  problems
"were  caused by  economic  shocks  that  caused nany banks
lead  to  bank  runs  or  panics"  (Rolnick  and l,Ieber,  1986,
I.Ieber (1984)  found  that  the  role  played  by  state  bonds
the  state  bond prograrns represented  bad public  policy,
to  free  banks (Whlte, 1985, pp.  891-95).
The recent  work  on  free  banking  has  generated  a
litefature  that  reassess  free  banking  historlcally  and
faced  by  free  banks
to  falL  but  did  not
p.  878).  Rolnlck  and
was significant,  YeE
not  an elenent  inherent
large  and  growing
theoretically.
Lacking,  however,  are  prograns  for  applying  the  inslghts  to  contenporary
monetary  insEitutions.  Advocates  face  the  classic  problem  of  getting  frorn
here  to  there.  So Lt  becomes a  question  of  creating  or  ewolving  parallel
institutions,15
In  a  separate  strand  of  literalure,  a numbar of  authors  offer  proposals
for  fundamental  institutlonal  change.  Less  grounded  in  hlstory,  the
literature  is  more dlrected  to  the  financial  future.  The critlques  of  the
cufrent  banking  system  also  focus  sornewhat  more on Dacroeconomlc  issues  than
on nlcroeconoroic problerns (e.g.,  price  stability  cornpared  to  bank failures).
Intellectual  and hlstorical  priority  in  the  literature  is  surely  held  by
Black  (1970).  He imagined  the  future  evolution  of  banking.  It  would  be  world
in  whtch  banks  were  free  to  offer  any variety  of  depository  liabilities  and
price  them as  they  choose.  In  Black's  world,  banks  cease  to  be  lnstitutions
whose distinctlveness  lies  in  their  producing  money.  In  this  world,  "money"
is  an  abstract  unit  of  account  and banks  the  place  in  which  exchanges  of  goods
are  registered.  The unit  of  account  is  no  longer  a means of  payrnent,  and
there  is  no  Longer  any  cifculating  nediun.  The unit  of  account  is  a kind  of
rnnemonic for  reglstering  exchanges  and entering  loans  and repa)menls  in  unitsof  equLvalent  value,  There  ls  no  reason  to  fear  of  restflct  the  creation  of
bank  deposits  --  their  supply  is  conpletely  endogenous to  real  transactions.
Reserve  requirenents  would  be  absent,  so  there  would  be  no  reason  for  open
market  operations  by  a  central  bank.  rln  such  a lrorld,  lt  would  not  be
posslble  to  give  any  reasonable  definitlon  of  the  quantity  of  money,  The
pa)nnents uechanlsm  in  such  a world  would  be very  efficient,  but  noney  ln  the
usual  sense would not  exlst,,  (Black,  L970, p.  9).
O'Driscoll  (1985) argued that,  both  historically  and theoretically,
circulating  money would  not  disappear.  Largely  unregulated  banking  systens
haVd produced  no  observable  tendency  for  circulating  money to  disappear.
Moreover,  Black's  banking  system  is  theoretically  incomplete.  Any banking
systern requires  somethlng  conslituting  final  settlement  between banks.  By  tts
nature,  the  good constltuting  final  palrnent  cannot  itself  be  a  liability
of  one of  the  banks.  I,Ihat the  good is  has  varied  over  time,  but  it  ls  base
noney  in  all  its  instantiations.  We can perhaps  contrive  a world  without
circulating  currency,  in  which  deblt  cafds  substitute  for  currency  and coin.
But we cannot  conceive  a banking  system without  a means  of  settlement,  i.e.,
banks  reserves  or  base  money.  Thus,  the  llrnltaElon  on bank  deposits  is  not  a
contrivance  but  a natural  phenomenon,16
Despite  the  faults  in  Black,s  arricle,  its  merits  had a significant
influence  on  subsequent  authors.  Though clearly  derivative,  Farna (l-980)
further  developed  Black's  vislon  of  an unregulated  pa1nrents systen.
Greenfield  and Yeager (1983) constitute  a genuine extension.  They present  a
blueprlnt  for  implenentlng  a  Black-Fama payments  system.  They  advocate  the
system  because  of  what  they  vievr  as  the  poor  nacroecononic  performance  of  fiat
money, whose supply  is  unresponsive  in  uhe shor!  run  to  changes  in  moneydexnand.  There  is  no  stability  of  value  in  our  current  xnonetary system,
because  purchasing  power  is  only  what  the  demand and  supply  for  money
fleetingly  accord  to  a  dollar,  pound or  franc.
Conpllcating  the  problems  is  the  fact  that  noney has  no market  of  its
own.  Consequently,  monetary  disequilibrium  must  be worked  out  in  4!!  rnarkets.
Further,  prices  are  inflexible  in  the  shor!  run.  ',Under these  realistic
clrcunstances,  failure  to  keep  the  quantity  of  money correctly  and  steadily
managed can have  momentous consequences"  (Greenfleld  and Yeager,  1983,  p.
309).  They conclude  that  nonetary  authorltles  are  not  up  to  the  task  of  so
precisely  nanaging  a  fiat  noney  supply.  They view  Black,s  vision  as
inplementable  and desirable.
Key to  their  proposal  is  the  government, s  defining  a  unit  of  value,  just
as  lt  does unlts  of  weight  and measurenent.  They suggest  a unit  of  value
encompassing a broadly  representatiwe  bundle  of  tradable  corunodities.  The
cornmodities  chosen,  however,  need not  be  either  stored  nor  slorable,  as  there
would  be  no  conwertibility.  Tn fact,  the  authors  point  to  the  lack  of
convertibility  as one of  the  systern,s chief  benefits.  "...The  value  unit
remains  stable  in  terms  of  the  deslBnated  cornrnodity bundle  because  its  value
never  did  depend on  direcu  convertibility  into  the  bundle  or  any  speclflc
conrnodity.  Instead.  its  walue  is  fixed  bv  definition.  It  is  free  of  any  link
to  issues  of  uroney that  xnight becorne inflated"  (Yeager  and Greenfleld,  1983,
p.  306;  ernphasis  added).
No one other  than  the  authors  seens  to  understand  how value  can be
effectively  fixed  by  definition.  A  great  deal  of  rhe  literarure  that  has
developed  around  the  orlginal  article  (lncludlng  responses  and additional
contributions  by  Greenfield  and Yeager)  deals  with  this  issue.  Ttre crltlcsLJ
have  not  been  able  to  understand  the  point,  and the  authors  hawe supplled  no
satisfactory  explanation.  To be  rnore precise,  Greenfield  and Yeager  have
speclfied  no market  mechanism naintaining  the  equivalence  of  defined  values
and  actual  prices.  Under  certain  circunstances,  convertlbillty  could
accornplish  this,  but  they  hawe ruled  out  chis  mechanl-srn.  It  would  be  fai.r  to
say  that  the  reader  is  being  asked  to  take  their  proposal  on  faith.
One can  approach  the  lssue  from  another  perspective.  yeager  and
Greenfield  (1-983,  pp.  307-08) allow  for  the  development of  debr  lnstnu0ents
denorninated  in  units  of  account.  I{hat  is  to  keep  these  lnstfunents  frorn
trading?  In  the  laissez  faire  systen  they  propose,  there  could  be  no basis
for  a  prohlbition.  Experience  telLs  us,  howewer,  that  tradable  debt
instruments  easily  becorne circulatlnt  rnedia,  like  bills  of  exchange  once were.
The final  stage  in  the  evolution  of  circulating  currency  comes when issuers
teaLi-ze  that  market  dlmamics  will  allow  them to  issue  non- interes  t -bearing
notes  (O'Driscol1,  1985, p.  28).  Now  we have the  market  dynarnics for  a
classic  case  of  overl-ssuance  of  circulating  xnedi.a.  An  issuer  can  trade  non-
interest  -bearing  currency  for  lnteres  t -bearing  debt.  He will  want  to  do  so 45!
libitum.  In  Greenfield  and Yeager's  systen,  we not  only  hawe the  potential
for  money's reenergence but  for  instabtllty  of  prices  in  the  extrene.
One rnus  t  conclude  that  Greenfield  and yeager  contains  a basic  error,
Price  stabillLy  cannot  be  attained  simply  by  definition.  Further,  though  they
beliewe  that  they  hawe ridded  their  system  of  circulating  noney,  the  syslem
contains  the  lncentives  to  reinttoduce  it.  Moreover,  in  their  system  there
would  be  no  central  bank  or  narket  constraint  on overissuance  of  fiat
currency.  The classical  criticism  of  unregulated  fiat  money remalns  intact.24
Such systems  require  some anchor  for  nominal  val-ues,  whether  provlded  by  a
central  bank  or  otherwise.
Conclusion
Itrs  been  said  that  bad monetary  practice  produces  good nonetary  theory.
Theorles  are  not  developed  ln  a vacuum,  and pressing  economlc problerns  often
stlrnulate  sound economic  analysis.  Recent  banking  difficulties  in  the  U.S.
have  stimulated  a host  of  policy  proposals.  These naturally  focus  on  the
crttical  role  played  by  deposiu  lnsurance  in  the  recent  wave of  bank  fallures.
While  perhaps  seeming  to  be  a peculiarly  American  problem,  the  bank  failures
reveal  the  po\.rerful  effects  that  bad  public  policy  can  generate.  As  Europe
dewelops  a  comprehensive  banking  policy,  the  coulrlunity  surely  wants  to  avoid
the  policy  traps  thar  have  lead  to  the  banking  problens  in  the  U.S.  Mosr
importantly,  policyrnakers  must  avoid  actions  that  hide  risk  and  lnsulate  risk-
takers  frorn  the  consequences of  their  actlons.
The cumulative  uonetary  aad banking  problerns  of  the  '50s,  ,70s,  and  ,80s
hawe also  generated  broader  and more far-reaching  reconmendations  for  changing
the  banking  system.  Because they  are  more lemoved from  immediate  public
policy  problems,  these  plans  tend  to  be more abstract  than  deposit
insufance  reforrn.  Nonetheless,  they  ralse  inportant  and  interesting  questions
that  rnerit  further  development  and  debate.25
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NOTES
L.  In  terns  of  job  creatlon,  the  U.S.  economy is  surely  the  env1/ of  the
world.  No other  major  country  --  not  even Japan  --  connes  close  in  this
regard.  From the  end of  1982 through  the  close  of  1988, U.S.  civili.an
enployment  expanded 15 percent  while  Japanese emplolment  grew  only  6.6
percent.  This  growch  translates  lnto  an average  annual  galn  of  over  2.1
nillion  jobs  in  the  U.S.  conpared  to  approxiuately  515  thousand  jobs  in  Japan.
(The  figures  represent  the  !g!  gains  ln  enployment.  See the  Handbook of  Labor
Statistics,  U.S.  Departroent  of  Labor,  Bureau of  Labor Statlstics,  Augus  t
r989  .  )
2,  It  is  true  that  the  Chairman of  the  Federal  Home  Loan Banking  System,
M.  Danny l^Ial1,  got  the  amount of  money that  he  requested.  trIhether  intenttonal
or  not,  Mr.  Wall  conslstently  underestimated  the  amount needed  --  at  least
initially  --  by  a  factor  of  roughly  ten  times.  It  ls  fairly  clear,  however,
that  until  recently,  Congress  as  a whole  had  refused  to  face  up  to  the
realities  of  the  thrift  problems.  In  a reaL  sense, Mr.  Wall  got  the  job
because he  prouised  to  contain  the  situation.  The political  crisis  carne  when
Mr.  WaIl,  realizlng  that  containment  was impossible,  came clean  publlcly  and
admltted  the  dimensions  of  the  problern were  rnuch greater  than  he  had
heretofore  acknowledged.
3,  The  "South\dest  Plan"  was a misnomer.  Many of  the  more notorlous
insolvent  thrifts  were  domiciled  ln  Texas.  The problero  of  insolvent
deposltory  institutions  is  national,  however,  not  regional,  in  scope.  Short
and cunther  (1988).
4.  Fron  this  polnt  on,  when I  use  the  tern  "bank"  (with  no nodifier)  I
will  mean any  depository  instltution.  In  the  Anefican  context,  this  covers
commercial  banks,  savings  and  loan  associacions,  sawings  banks  and credit
unions.  Each type  of  banking  organization  is  covered  by  a  legally  separate
deposit  insurance  agency.  A1l  the  ageneies  are  effectively  backed  by  the  fu11
faith  and  credit  of  the  U.  S.  sovefrnnent.
5.  Most  deweloped countries  now hawe some system  of  deposit  insurance,
Most  are  of  recent  vintage  compared to  that  in  the  United  States.  Further,  in
no  other  country  has  the  deposit  insurance  system  played  the  same role  as  it
has ln  the  United  States
6.  "Casual  observation  lndicates  that  [households  and companies]  ate
very  rnuch aware of  what  money narket  fund  balance  sheets  are,  much more aware
than  of  what  bank  balance  sheets  are.  Nor  is  it  accidental  that  funds  and29
banks differ  so  ln  their  balance  sheets"  (Kareken,  198f,  p.  4).  Money  narket
funds  are  uutual  funds  holding  a portfolio  of  sholt-tern  liquld  assets.
Note  that  the  argument  does not  assume that  investors  never  make errors
or  even  that  their  analysls  ls  cornplete  or  even adequate.  It  merely  asserts
that  depository  credltors  of  banks  are  less  knowledgeable  about  their  bank
deposits  than  about  other  lnvestments.  Ihis  is  a  conundrum that  must be
explai.ned.
7.  Banking  regulators  do not  specify  exactly  which  banks  are  too  large
to  fail.  At  the  tine  the  doctrine  was publicly  announced by  the  Conptroller
of  the  Currency,  'rat  least"  the  top  11-  banks  were  lncluded.  Banking  analysts
generally  believe  that  at  least  the  top  20 banks  are  presently  included,
8.  For  an exceLl-ent  sunnary  of  the  regulatory  actions  in  the  early
1980s, see Barth,  et  aI.  The authors  already  saw the  cost  of  policy
procras tination:  "...Not  closing  these  Iinsolvent]  institutions  most likely
increases  the  eventual  cost  to  the  FSLIC,  as  the  institutions  tfy  to  overcoxne
their  problems through  riskier  activities.  Therefore,  delay  is  costly."  To
put  things  Ln perspectlve,  if  thrift  problerns had been  resolved  ln  1985  --  the
year  this  article  was r,Tritten  --  the  cost  would  probably  have  been  on  the
order  of  one- tenth  what  it  will  be  now.
9.  A  polltlcal  decision  was  made  to  hand  ovef
the  thrift  problera  to  the  FDIC,  even  rhough  FSLIC  is
10.  As will  be seen in  lrhat  follows,  there  ls
private  deposit  insurance  is  not  a viable  product.
premiuls  would  have  to  be  risk  sensitive.
the  problero  of  roanaging
the  insurer  of  record.
no presumption  that
To be viable,  however,
11.  In  the  United  States,
Sone activitles  not  pernisslble
parent  company,  The concept  is
viewed  as  inherently  rnore risky
itself.  The bank  would  rhen  be
nonbanking  actlvlties.  Indeed,
should  be  na source  of  strensth,,
comPauy,
rnany banks  are  part  of  a  holding  company.
for  cornmetcial  banks  are  permissible  for  the
that  the  nonbank actlvities,  some of  which  are
than  banking,  be  conducted  outside  the  bank
isolated  frorn  deleterious  effects  of  the
the  Federal  Reserve  Systen  believes  these
for  the  banklng  actlvitles  of  the  holding
L2.  It  should  be  noted  that  Litan  has  backed  away from  his  original
proposal.  He ls  a coaulhor  of  Benston,  ec al.  (1989),  whlch represents  a more
centrist  position  in  the  public  policy  debate.
13.  White,  and Rolnlck  and l^leber followed  in  the  intellectual  footsteps
of  Rockoff  (L974).  This  serninal  vrork was largely  neglected,  however,  excepc30
by  econonic  historians.  The debate  over  free  banking  has  now gained  broad
attention  l-n lhe  economics orofession.
L4.  White  (1984,  p.  l)  defines  free  banklng  as  "the  system  under  l.rhlch
there  are  no political  restrictions  on the  business  of  issuing  currency
convertible  lnto  full-bodled  coin. "
15.  Jordan  (1989) does offer  a rather  explicit  transition  proposal  to  a
free  banking  systen  that  builds  on  the  existing  structure  of  Federal  Reserve
Banks.  On the  face  of  it,  the  proposal  appears  econonically  feasible  but
politically  lnprobable.
L6,  Also  validated  is  the  classlcal  conclusion  that,  without  a
linitatlon  on  the  quantity  of  bank  liabilities,  there  is  no  anchor  for  nominal
values in  the econorny  (O'Driscoll,  1985, pp.  5-7).RESEARCH  PAPERS  OF THE RESEARCH  DEPARTMENT
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